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Ancient Wisdom and the Modern Temper. On the Role of 
Greek Philosophy and the Jewish Tradition in Hans Jonas’s 
Philosophical Anthropology 
 
Fabio Fossa 
 
 
Abstract: The question about the essence of man and his 
relationship to nature is certainly one of the most impor-
tant themes in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. One of the 
ways by which Jonas approaches the issue consists in a 
comparison between the contemporary interpretation of 
man and forms of wisdom such as those conveyed by an-
cient Greek philosophy and the Jewish tradition. The re-
construction and discussion of these frameworks play a 
fundamental role in Jonas’s critique of the modern mind. 
In the first section I introduce the anthropological prob-
lem in Hans Jonas’s oeuvre. Moreover, I clarify why it 
becomes essential for Jonas to resort to different forms of 
traditional wisdom. In the second and third sections I try 
to give an account (as complete as possible) of the two 
generalisations which Jonas shapes in order to criticise 
the modern concepts of man and nature. In the last section 
I show how Jonas links these generalisations to his own 
philosophical assessment of modernity. Finally, I focus on 
his methodology, which exemplifies how critical thinking 
may arise from a reconsideration of traditional contents. 
 
Keywords: Hans Jonas, Philosophical Anthropology, 
Greek Philosophy, Jewish Thought, Value of Tradition. 
 
 
1. The Anthropological Question in the Philosophy of 
Hans Jonas 
 
 The anthropological question – i.e., the question con-
cerning the essence of man and his relationship to the 
world – is a topic that caught Jonas’s attention since his 
early writings and kept engaging him until his last works1. 
As a student of Martin Heidegger during the 1920s, Jonas 
was deeply impressed by the existential analysis of Sein 
und Zeit and tried to apply Heidegger’s ideas to the study 
of man in the late antiquity. Both Augustin und das pau-
linische Freiheitsproblem2 (1930) and Gnosis und spätan-
tiker Geist (1934-54) share an interest in historical inter-
pretations of man and the world. After his shift to a more 
theoretical attitude, in 1963 Jonas gave the subheading 
Zur Lehre vom Menschen to his book Zwischen Nichts 
und Ewigkeit3. The essays there collected flew then into 
the last section of The Phenomenon of Life4 (1966), which 
is dedicated to a “Philosophy of Man”. He elaborated fur-
ther on the anthropological question in his best-known 
work, Das Prinzip Verantwortung5 (1979), and in related 
writings such as Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität6 
(1981) or Technik, Medizin und Ethik7 (1987). Finally, 
Jonas’s last book, Philosophische Untersuchungen und 
metaphysische Vermutungen8 (1994), starts again with a 
section dedicated to “Organism and the Theory of Man”. 
 This is just a sketch of the presence of anthropological 
themes in Jonas’s works and it does not claim to be ex-
haustive. Although the spectrum of Jonas’s thoughts on 
man is extremely wide, I think it possible to recognise 
two different, yet related patterns of reasoning. On the 
one hand, Jonas approaches the anthropological question 
from a phenomenological point of view in order to in-
clude man in his general theory of organism or philoso-
phical biology. This pattern draws upon several concepts 
Jonas developed in The Phenomenon of Life and it is not 
properly understandable apart from those. Essays such as 
The Nobility of Sight9, Image-making and the Freedom of 
Man10, and Tool, Image and Grave11 belong to this pat-
tern12. On the other hand, Jonas tackles the same issues 
from a cultural and historical perspective as well. The 
motives that inspire this pattern are the same operating in 
Jonas’s early writings. In so doing, Jonas clarifies the 
terms by which the anthropological question presented 
itself to him. At the same time, this kind of considerations 
enable him to set a specific task to philosophy, the same 
task that he would try and carry out by developing the 
former pattern. This second approach reveals all its poten-
tial in the essay Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism13 
(1952).  
 Although many different studies belong to it, this pat-
tern exhibits an intrinsic unity which stems from the re-
course to the same historical-philosophical approach. This 
sort of argument strategy consists in reconstructing tradi-
tional images of man and the world in order to reach a 
standpoint from which to criticise the modern mind.  
 As it is well known, Jonas’s main targets are the im-
ages of man and nature conveyed by Heidegger’s phi-
losophy of existence and scientific natural monism. Put 
briefly, the most significant flaw of the Heideggerian 
standpoint lies in its incongruous dualism, that is, in the 
claim that man and nature are ontologically heterogene-
ous terms. In Jonas’s opinion, Heidegger resorts to a spe-
cific metaphysical language though depriving it of its own 
theoretical background. As a result, his interpretation of 
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man, which is based on the concept of thrownness, is in-
consistent. In fact, Jonas claims, while Heidegger fails to 
properly address the question as to whence Dasein is 
thrown, this is exactly the essential aim of the general 
mythological framework to which the notion of thrown-
ness belongs. As a consequence, Heidegger cannot but 
condemn man to be «a project from nothingness into 
nothingness»14, which in Jonas’s opinion is a false per-
spective. 
 A different but equally false standpoint, Jonas be-
lieves, lies at the basis of what is addressed as the techno-
scientific interpretation of nature. According to this 
framework, nature is brute matter void of any intrinsic 
meaning over which to exercise full control. As a conse-
quence, the scientific mind denies acknowledgement to 
any dimension of being other than physical existence. So, 
scientific reductionism leads to a monistic viewpoint 
within which living things and human beings are just an-
other physical object to be understood and manipulated. 
This is, in Jonas’s opinion, a misleading interpretation, 
since it fails to acknowledge the phenomenon of life in 
general and, specifically, it overlooks the distinctive 
properties of human life.  
 In order to overcome these disappointing alternatives, 
philosophy must follow a path on the edge between Hei-
deggerian dualism and scientific monism. The first pat-
tern of anthropological reflection I mentioned earlier aims 
to reach this goal by means of an ontological revolution15 
which would revaluate the theoretical weight of the phe-
nomenon of life over brute matter. However, this is not 
the only way by which Jonas carries out his task. On and 
off throughout his entire work he conducts an intense dia-
logue with traditional forms of wisdom, which helps him 
bring the whole issue into focus. Why is that so? 
 In order to develop his criticism, Jonas needs to high-
light virtual possibilities which may be still available 
though hidden by the two dominant views. Then, he must 
turn to theoretical frameworks the main assumptions of 
which are entirely incompatible to those of the modern 
mind. In this situation, in fact, he would get no support by 
sticking to his own times. So, since he believes that the 
so-called modern mind derives mostly from Christianity16, 
Jonas focuses on classical Greek philosophy and the Jew-
ish tradition with the intention of reconstructing the inter-
pretations of man conveyed by those cultural frameworks. 
In so doing, Jonas shapes two generalisations which pro-
vides him with a guideline to expand on his research. My 
aim is to follow up his outline of these generalisations and 
to show how these studies assist him in his philosophical 
efforts17. In the next section I take into consideration 
Jonas’s thoughts on the image of man conveyed by classi-
cal Greek philosophy. After that, I deal with the image of 
man which, in his opinion, belongs to the Jewish tradi-
tion. Finally, I show the results of such a revaluation of 
traditional contents and I make some general observation 
on Jonas’s methodology. 
 
 
2. Classical Greek Philosophy: the Man as Polites 
 
 While Jonas’s notes on the Jewish tradition are quite 
gathered, his remarks on the classical interpretation of 
man and the world are scattered all over his oeuvre. Most 
of them can be found in Gnosis und spätantiker Geist and 
in The Gnostic Religion18 (1958). The first chapter of Das 
Prinzip Verantwortung is significant in this regard too. 
Moreover, essays like Is God a Mathematician?19 (1951), 
The Practical Uses of Theory20 (1959), and Immortality 
and the Modern Temper21 (1961), as well as the 1970 
course Problems of Freedom, testify his long-lasting in-
terest in the classical theory of man22. Although Jonas 
turns back to this topic repeatedly, his main ideas do not 
vary during the years and, therefore, may be considered 
together. What Jonas proposes is beyond doubt a gener-
alisation, a scheme that does not apply to every specific 
case. Historical accuracy is certainly not what Jonas 
seeks. Before clarifying Jonas’s intentions, however, it is 
necessary to organise his many remarks. 
 In Jonas’s opinion, the primary feature of the Greek 
mind is a strong belief in the autonomy and perfection of 
the universe. Our world is a necessary part of the divine 
whole—even though, to some extent, a deprived and 
lesser one. This is, Jonas claims, a sort of cultural a priori 
which lasted until the final hour of the Greek civilisation. 
Plato’s ideas, Aristotle’s forms, even Stoic Logos are 
thought of as different expressions of this single principle, 
inasmuch as they are idealisations of contents which be-
long to this world. This is why Jonas defines classical phi-
losophy as a «self-sufficient intramundane metaphys-
ics»23. The world as a whole is the main object of the 
Greek thought. Its attempt to get in touch with the very 
essence of reality relies on the idealization of this world. 
As a consequence, there is no place for any anti-mundane 
idea such as the Stranger God of the Gnosis. In the Greek 
metaphysical framework every concept is embedded in 
this world. 
 The kernel of this outlook is the understanding of the 
world as kosmos, i.e., as a well-ordered, self-contained 
and everlasting whole24. This is the world the demiurge 
shapes in the Timaeus: a living being, intelligent and di-
vine, an imitation of eternity in time25. For what concerns 
the temporal dimension, the kosmos is eternal, unborn, 
and undying. Its time flows in a circular, repetitive way. 
This recurring structure supports the biological experi-
ence of time of some of its hosts. However, this limited 
experience does not spoil the eternal steadiness of the 
kosmos, which absorbs the unstable and futile becoming 
in its universal order26. Harmony and rationality are em-
bedded in the very essence of the world. The universe is 
therefore a magnificent example of beauty which inspires 
reverence and piety. It is a divine being, in the Greek 
sense of the word. The stars and the skies symbolises its 
divine essence through their regular, eternal, and law-
abiding movements27. They offer a clear image of the 
kosmos itself, of its stability and endurance. Thus, they 
serve as a persuasive example of the Greek idealisation of 
the world. 
 The Greek kosmos displays not only quantitative as-
pects, but also qualities and values that the human mind is 
able to recognise. Human beings exist in a positive, mean-
ingful context which is not a mere stage at their disposal. 
Nature is a divine entity and man is a part of it. Humanity 
belongs to the universal logos28. So, there is no gap either 
between being and values or between nature and man. 
The universe is a holon, a whole whose parts fully exist 
only in their mutual relationships. For this reason, in the 
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classical framework the anthropological question can only 
be addressed properly by considering man’s position in 
the world—or, which is the same, by considering man as 
a part of a whole. In order to fulfil his own nature, man 
must adjust his behaviour to the cosmic law. So, although 
the kosmos is not affected by man’s deeds, man has the 
power to achieve a fulfilled existence in this world. The 
best form of life man could ever live gets him in contact 
with the world for two reasons. First, the world offers all 
the information man needs to determine his position and 
consequently his tasks. Secondly, this world is the only 
and true dimension where man can reach fulfilment and 
happiness. Human beings’ fulfilment lies in perfecting 
their natural qualities by playing their role in the kos-
mos29. Hence, the existential attitude of the Greek theory 
of man is a sense of belonging to this world.  
 The proper human space in the world is the polis30, 
which represents the practical requirement of the classical 
worldview. The polis is the middle term that guarantees 
an enduring agreement between man and the natural or-
der, thus allowing him to fulfil his own nature. In fact, the 
city embodies the unity of all the citizens through time. It 
redeems their limited and suffering lives by raising them 
to eternal relevance and glory. As a living whole, the 
polis remains identical with itself despite changes in its 
components. In so doing, it reproduces the eternal recur-
rence of nature. Indeed, the city is a natural entity, some-
thing that does not belong to human initiative entirely, but 
to the order of things. This is why the Greek citizen be-
lieves in immortality31. He strives to survive in the ever-
lasting memory of the city and, as a consequence, he acts 
as if the eyes of the whole city were pointed at him. The 
polites identifies himself with the laws and traditions of 
the city, nomos and ethos, which shape the most excellent 
ways of life32. In so doing, he harmonizes himself to the 
cosmic order, being the city an expression of that order in 
the first place. By taking part to the political life of the 
city, man accomplishes his natural goal. He reaches per-
fection by becoming a polites. 
 The polis is, then, the proper environment for man to 
endorse a virtuous way of life and fulfil his life on earth. 
According to Jonas, the Greek mind enjoys a self-
confident attitude towards its own possibilities. This atti-
tude, however, stems from neither a sense of powerful-
ness nor the belief in an ontological privilege. By con-
trast, it originates from a dispassionate awareness of 
man’s limitations. As a consequence, the ideal of self-
accomplishment is kept close to human existence and, at 
the same time, any feeling of cosmic inadequacy or de-
spair is marginalised. The concept of arete is most rele-
vant in this regard33. The aretai represent the most excel-
lent ways of living in the world. In fact, virtues indicate 
which worldly ends are suitable for man and how to act in 
order to achieve them. By adopting a virtuous attitude, 
man can bring to perfection the natural faculties with 
which his soul is endowed. As man’s efforts to put reason 
in charge consciously reaffirm a natural fact, virtues allow 
man to meet the demands of his own nature. This is why 
the telos is always within man’s grasp. The ideal of the 
good life does not require any reference to an upper level 
which may conflict with the laws of the world or which 
may require a more-than-human dedication. Greek virtues 
establish a praxis, that is, an actualization of the authentic 
possibilities imprinted in human nature and embedded in 
the laws and traditions of the city. For this reason, Jonas 
thinks, the typical mood of Greek being-in-the-world is a 
sense of existential belonging and a feeling of disen-
chanted self-confidence. 
 The virtuous life accomplished in and thanks to the 
city represents the polites’ perfection, that is, the fulfil-
ment of what his position in the kosmos requires. At the 
same time, as I mentioned earlier, this sort of wisdom 
shows a negative side. The Greek man does not overesti-
mate his condition nor try to rearrange the order of things 
in his favour. He knows that his own deeds are nothing 
compared to the natural order and looks to the kosmos 
with a mixed feeling of sacred fear and resignation. More 
specifically, he knows that every human project takes 
place in the unpredictable realm of Tuche and that there-
fore he is not entirely in control of his own life34. None-
theless, Jonas thinks that this is not a despairing evidence 
for the Greek mind. It is up to the resourceful man to face 
the changeable circumstances in which human beings are 
bound to exist. So, classical fatalism does not conflict 
with freedom, but describes the context in which freedom 
can express itself. Consequently, the Greek man is not a 
stranger in a world he can’t cope with. He does not carry 
the destiny of the world on his shoulder either. The results 
he achieves are related to his own situation, their effects 
are bound to disappear soon and their importance from a 
cosmic perspective is none35. 
 This fatalistic conception corresponds to the actual 
size of the ancient Greek man’s power of action36. The 
ancient Greek man is the master of himself within the 
walls of the city, but this kind of power cannot compete 
with the kosmos. Nature shows human beings the way to 
fulfilment, sets the general boundaries of human activity, 
and is by no means modified by human deeds. All man’s 
efforts and conquests drain away in nature’s recurring 
identity. The uncertainty of human affairs is a defining 
condition of all human deeds, which are bound to dissolve 
themselves in the cosmic order. So, the human condition 
is doomed to remain essentially the same forever. That is 
why the distant future is not a problem in the eyes of the 
polites. Rather, he is concerned with what happens during 
his lifetime and among his fellow citizens. In his ethical 
and political worries he’s not pressed by irreversible and 
long-lasting consequences. Proximity circumscribes the 
range of Greek actions. 
 
 
3. The Jewish Tradition: the Man as Repository 
 
 Before assessing how the Greek framework assists 
Jonas in his philosophical task, let us take into considera-
tion his thoughts on the Jewish vision of the world. In this 
case it is much easier to realise where to look, since Jonas 
addresses this specific topic in Jewish and Christian Ele-
ments in Philosophy37 (1967) and Contemporary Prob-
lems in Ethics from a Jewish Perspective38 (1968). In 
1968 Jonas wrote the first version of The Concept of God 
after Auschwitz39 as well. However, the well-known myth 
appeared for the first time in the already mentioned essay 
Immortality and the Modern Temper, which dates back to 
1961 and must be taken into consideration too, since it 
contains some elements of great interest. Finally, I will 
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refer also to lesson VII of the 1970 course Problems of 
Freedom40. 
 Whilst the Greek vision of the world is based on the 
idea of kosmos, the cornerstone of the Jewish standpoint 
is the concept of creation. Yet, creation implies the begin-
ning of time, which in turn rules out the possibility of 
considering this world as an eternal entity. This means 
that creation and kosmos give birth to mutually exclusive 
conceptions of the world. In the Jewish framework, ne-
cessity and contingency, universals and particulars, will 
and reason are no more harmonious parts of a general sys-
tem. On the contrary, they express a duality that stems 
from the distinction between the Creator and His crea-
tures. For example, the experience of time passing con-
cerns only creatures, which are bound to perish in the 
same way they were once brought into being. There is of 
course a relationship between God and the creation. Nev-
ertheless, God and the world are two separate entities and 
must not be unified or confused. The world cannot be un-
derstood as an image of God either, since this is only a 
man’s privilege. Man is the image of God, while the 
world is God’s work. In a word, the Jewish tradition 
seems to support a dualistic conception of being, with 
God and Nature as ontologically different entities and 
man as a middle term which, however, is made in the im-
age of the Creator.  
 From the glorification of the transcendent God and, to 
some extent, of man as His own image might very well 
follow a corresponding underestimation of the world. 
However, in Jonas’s opinion the Jewish tradition does not 
convey a form of radical dualism. Anti-cosmic beliefs, 
Jonas claims, do not belong to this framework. For, in this 
perspective, the world neither exists by itself nor is the 
outcome of a tragic incident, but originates from an act of 
will and is shaped according to a divine project that pre-
cedes it. Moreover, God expressed satisfaction for his 
own work: the world met its maker’s expectations. There-
fore, there are values embedded in the world, even if the 
world is not the source of them. Despite the difference 
between God and nature, the goodness of God’s work re-
flects its maker’s qualities. Its magnificence inspires ad-
miration and respect. So, since this world is the actualiza-
tion of God’s will, it is provided with an inner meaning. 
 Let us now turn back to man as an image of God. Ac-
cording to this conception, man is the concretisation of an 
eternal and divine image. Yet, this image neither is just 
man’s mould nor simply stands for a matter of fact. It rep-
resents also an ideal which assigns a life-long task41. The 
image shows how man is related to true and objective 
moral values, as they are revealed by God and embedded 
in the creation. From a Jewish perspective, man’s task 
consists in approaching to that ideal, or even in actualiz-
ing the divine resemblance. Then, a metaphysical dignity 
belongs to every human being, and it calls for acknow-
ledgement and care. The resemblance, and the dignity that 
comes from it, establishes an eternal existential attitude. 
Therefore, moral wisdom is not a progressive form of 
knowledge as modern science is and the modern man 
does not stand at the peak of a continuous moral progress. 
The main contents of morality have been given to man-
kind once for all and man must preserve their meaning-
fulness through history42. Tradition is the only vehicle of 
moral wisdom, since it offers the possibility of moral 
education. So, the form of wisdom bequeathed by tradi-
tion is based on an eternal message to man. Man is the 
repository of such universal and objective wisdom. By 
studying, pondering, interpreting, and testing it, he may 
live up to the demands of his own essence. Man’s task 
consists in meaningfully binding together the everlasting 
message of tradition and the unique historical circum-
stances in which he exists. 
 In addition, the Jewish tradition passes on some sug-
gestions about man’s relationship to the world. As we 
have already seen, Jonas claims that the Jewish concep-
tion of the world does not imply anti-cosmic beliefs even 
though it supports a dualistic ontology. From this tenet 
follows very important consequences for our technologi-
cal age. Since nature is God’s work and bears positive 
values, creation is not entirely at man’s disposal. Of 
course man’s dignity is superior to that of nature, which 
makes him nature’s master. Yet, his authority is not abso-
lute at all. In fact, God entrusted his work to man, expect-
ing him to be a responsible guardian of the wellbeing of 
the world. Man is not allowed to establish a dictatorship. 
On the contrary, he is expected to act as a good master 
who cares for the wellbeing of the subjects. Man must 
take care of nature, since it mirrors God’s splendour: he 
must acknowledge God’s assignment and protect nature’s 
richness. So, the glory of man, which makes him the mas-
ter of the world, does not consent to his dictatorship, but 
makes him responsible (and accountable) for nature’s 
safeguard. 
 These last thoughts match the reflection, which Jonas 
expressed in Immortality and the Modern Temper, on the 
biblical Book of Life43. In Psalm 69: 28-29 and in Mala-
chi 3:16, for example, the Book of Life is a sort of ledger 
in which God writes down people’s names and merits. In 
Jonas’s opinion, it may be interpreted as a record of all 
human actions and their consequences on human dig-
nity—or, on the Image of Man—and on the wellbeing of 
nature. The constantly delayed balance this divine chroni-
cle involves is an evaluation of man’s governance. The 
Book of Life symbolizes the relationship between man 
and nature, which within the Jewish framework must be 
one of care, respect and responsibility. As Jonas writes, 
man is «the eminent repository of this supreme and ever 
betrayable trust»44. 
 
 
4. Towards a Third Way? Tradition as a Source of 
Critical Thinking 
 
 As noted earlier, Jonas’s interest in the Greek and 
Jewish conceptions of man and the world is essentially 
theory-laden. Jonas addresses these forms of wisdom 
while searching for something specific. He is looking for 
different perspectives which would help him overcome 
the anthropological dead end sketched in the first section 
of this paper. He does not aim at a thorough historical ac-
count of classical Greek philosophy or of the Jewish cul-
ture. By contrast, Jonas shapes two generalisations which 
serve him as supports for his philosophical task. The 
frameworks he elaborates, no matter how historically ac-
curate, work as alternative interpretations of man and the 
world which sustain the critical efforts of the philosopher.  
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 More than revealing something specific about the cul-
tures to which these frameworks are supposed to belong, 
Jonas puts in practice a method of historical reasoning 
which is based on (and relies on) the critical power of tra-
dition. Tradition, in Jonas’s opinion, is not a set of notions 
which belong exclusively to a particular moment in the 
past. Rather, human cultural tradition hands down ideas, 
the meaningfulness of which the contemporary man can 
explore in order to understand, define, and criticise his 
own condition. This means that a plain restoration of the 
past neither is possible nor desirable. The actual condi-
tions of a particular historical situation must not be over-
looked. However, they do not make traditional wisdom 
useless. The present is a mediation of the past, heavy with 
future. Man has to carry out this mediation, that is, he has 
to understand it in order to act responsibly in it. For this is 
one of man’s most important tasks, it is immediately clear 
how the Jewish conception of man as a repository of a 
meaningful tradition influences Jonas’s mind. 
 This is not the only aspect which catches Jonas’s at-
tention. One of the most important steps in finding out a 
third way between Heideggerian dualism and scientific 
monism consists in conceiving a positive idea of nature. 
This idea, however, has to be compatible with man’s spe-
cific difference45. In order to think man and nature to-
gether, without reducing one to the other, it is necessary 
to locate the foundations of morality within nature itself. 
In other words, Jonas thinks that the so-called Hume’s 
law must be put aside. Nature is not a value-indifferent 
object46. This is what Jonas aims to demonstrate in The 
Phenomenon of Life.  
 Now, both the Greek and Jewish frameworks refer to a 
positive concept of nature which delimits man’s will and 
constitutes a positive context to his activity. Going be-
yond the modern domination of nature, Jonas seeks the 
conditions of a being-in-the-world based on the idea of 
responsible dwelling. Only a world that manifests inner 
values may be fully dwelled and not just exploited. Like-
wise, only a positive conception of nature may support 
man’s pursuit of the good life. In fact, man is capable of 
no satisfaction unless he acknowledges the meaningful 
context in which he exists. Values are embedded in nature 
and call for respect and care. The Greek admiration for 
the beauty of kosmos and the related conception of this 
world as the true dimension of moral fulfilment may still 
have something to say in this respect. The same goes for 
the Jewish esteem for God’s work and the related com-
mitment to its good administration. Thanks to the media-
tion of traditional standpoints, the contemporary man may 
rediscover himself as a part of a whole, as an entity which 
is not thrown into the world, but belongs to it.  
 So, this interpretation of nature matches a correspond-
ing interpretation of man. What makes Jonas’s task so dif-
ficult is the necessity to keep man close to nature without 
reducing him to its components or functions, that is, to the 
physical side of existence. In this regard, classical Greek 
philosophy and the Jewish tradition hint at two different 
options between which Jonas constantly swings. He is 
fascinated by the classical idea of man, based on the natu-
ral monism of kosmos. Yet, in The Phenomenon of Life he 
theorises a metaphysical gap between human and animal 
life47 which cannot but remind the reader of the Jewish 
idea of man as God’s image. Jonas tries to establish man’s 
full belonging to nature and yet he is always troubled with 
the actual extent of man’s naturality. The problem of the 
so-called metaphysical gap between man and nature is 
beyond doubt one of the most complex the critics of 
Jonas’s philosophy have to face. Perhaps deepening our 
understanding of Jonas’s appraisal of the Greek and Jew-
ish anthropological thought may shed an interesting light 
on this puzzling question. 
 It has already been said that, in order to unveil their 
hidden potential, traditional tenets cannot be taken as they 
are. On the contrary, they must be reread with an eye to 
the present conditions of man’s existence. In this media-
tion, tradition shows its everlasting meaningfulness. The 
actual circumstances of a historical situation determine 
the critical value of tradition. Jonas is very careful in as-
sessing the specific characteristics of his age. He is well 
aware that technology has essentially modified the human 
power of action and that modern human agency is very 
different from that of the polites. Similarly, he knows that 
the modern mind has come into terms with religion and 
God. Still, tradition may speak to the philosopher and 
help him developing a critical appraisal of his own situa-
tion. Tradition allows the philosopher to put a critical dis-
tance between himself and his time without losing con-
nection to it. This is not a conservative attitude towards 
the present, but a responsible way to dwell in the world 
and face the future consciously. 
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